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Abstract
This paper discusses some issues that arise when applying structural realism to
biology. I begin by reviewing Katherine Brading’s version of structural realism with a
hierarchy with proliferation of models.1 I then attempt to apply Brading’s structural
realism to a biological example. This biological example suggests an issue with the use
of shared structure. In response, I suggest the use of relevant relations instead of shared
structure. I then discuss Steven French’s use of eliminativist ontic structural realism in
biology. Additionally, I consider John Dupré and Maureen A. O’Malley’s discussion of
metagenomics and claim that biological entities are better described as self-sustaining
biological processes.2 These metagenomic insights suggest an eliminativist view is
preferable in biology. I conclude with an attempt to combine Brading’s and French’s
approaches into an eliminativist relevant relationalism that retains the structuralist
flavor and is applicable to the fluid, constantly changing entities found in biology.
Introduction
What does it mean when science proves something? Answers to this question can be found
in the realism/anti-realism debate. Briefly, scientific realism argues that it would be akin
to a miracle if science made all of these empirically successful predictions without what the
theory says about the world being real.3 A common critique of scientific realism argues that
its dependence on continuity in science cannot account for the fact that the history of science
suggests that science goes through scientific revolutions.4 Structuralism was purposed as a
way to keep scientific realism while accounting for these scientific revolutions. The benefit
1. Katherine Brading, “Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Modality,” chap. 3 in
Scientific Structuralism, ed. Alisa Bokulich and Peter Bokulich, vol. 281, Boston Studies in the Philosophy
of Science (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011), 43–65, isbn: 9789048195978, doi:10.1007/978-90-481-
9597-8_3.
2. John Dupré and Maureen A. O’Malley, “Metagenomics and biological ontology,” Studies in History
and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38 (2007): 842.
3. John Worrall, “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?,” Dialectica 43, nos. 1-2 (1989): 101.
4. Ibid., 103-105.
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of structuralism is that theories can undergo content changes while still latching on to an
underlying structure. This underlying structure is what accounts for the continuing empirical
success of scientific theories while allowing for vast changes in content. As John Worrall
points out “Einstein’s equations undeniably go over to Newton’s in certain limiting special
cases. In this sense, there is ‘approximate continuity’ of structure in this case.”5 In physics,
it makes sense that old equations could be considered limiting cases of new equations; but
what happens for sciences where equations are less common, like in biology?
In assessing the applicability of structuralism to biology, I begin by reviewing Katherine
Brading’s version of structural realism that includes a hierarchy with proliferation of models.6
Brading clearly describes why her version of structuralism works well with physic theories
that are applicable in various models and to various data sets. However, when I try to apply
Brading’s structural realism to biology, it becomes apparent that shared structure needs to
be changed to shared relations. I then present one of the few structural realist views applied
to biology: Steven French’s eliminativist ontic structural realism. I agree with French that
John Dupré and Maureen A. O’Malley’s discussion of metagenomics points towards the
need for an eliminativist version of structural realism. According to Dupré and O’Malley,
“metagenomics - also called environmental genomics, community genomics, ecogenomics or
microbial population genomics - consists of the genome-based analysis of entire communities
of complexly interacting organisms in diverse ecological contexts.”7 Dupré and O’Malley
argue that given the results of metagenomic studies, biological organisms are better described
as self-sustaining biological processes.8 The influence of metagenomics suggests that a few
adjustments need to be made to both French and Brading’s theories. These issues lead to
my solution: eliminativist relevant relationalism.
5. Worrall, “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?,” 121.
6. Brading, “Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Modality.”
7. Dupré and O’Malley, “Metagenomics and biological ontology,” 835.
8. Ibid., 842.
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Structural realism with a hierarchy with proliferation of
models
Figure 1 Brading’s Fig. 3.1 Suppesian possible hierarchy of theories
In “Chapter 3 Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models, and Modality”
of Scientific Structuralism, Katherine Brading, discusses issues that arise when attempting
to provide a structural realist account for the domain of physics.9 Brading begins with a
“semantic view of theories” (See Figure 1) which connects phenomena to a theory using
a hierarchy of models rather than a set of rules and definitions.10 Brading’s final view of
structural realism contains modifications to the original semantic view and is described as
a “hierarchy with proliferation of models (II)”.11 In this form of structural realism, multiple
models of data and mediating models connect to a model of a high level theory through
a “relationship of shared structure”.12 It is then this entire hierarchy of models together
9. Brading, “Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Modality.”
10. Ibid., 44.
11. Ibid., 53.
12. Ibid.
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that is meant to represent the structure found in the world. As Brading puts it, “the
realist who subscribes to the semantic view of theories believes that there is a model of
the high level theory that accurately represents the world (or some subsystem of it), and
the intermediate levels of the hierarchy become “transparent” when it comes to the content
of the realist’s beliefs about the world.”13 One of the main modifications Brading makes
is to include multiple mediating models and data models. This is because it is important
for Brading that the mediating models are “partially independent or autonomous” in order
to be consistent with scientific theorizing.14 The effect of this partial autonomy is that the
mediating models may be incompatible.
Figure 2 Applying Structural Realism to the Domain of Physics
As an example Brading considers Newton’s theories and the two-body problem in physics.15
According to Brading, a structural realist can use shared structure to explain how data mod-
els of not perfectly spherical masses, mediating models and Newton’s laws of motion and
the law of universal gravitation are connected. The high-level theory includes Newton’s
laws of motion and the law of universal gravitation. In experiments, the likelihood is low
13. Original italics and quotes. Brading, “Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Modal-
ity,” 54.
14. Ibid., 45.
15. Ibid., 48.
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that any spherical mass will be considered a perfect sphere. So, the data models are the
data sets collected during experiments that contain not perfectly spherical masses. Since
the high level Newtonian theories can be applied in different ways and for different reasons,
multiple mediating models must be created in order to account for these differences. These
differences also mean that different data sets or data models could be used. The resulting
picture (Figure 2) is a hierarchy with a proliferation of models that all share structure with
the model of the high level theory.16
Now that we have an idea of a structural realist approach to physics, let’s see if we can
find an example for biology. In my view, we could consider ‘the theory of evolution’ a high
level theory in biology. This theory is then applied to the biological world in a model of
the high level theory of evolution. From there, a hierarchy of mediating models and data
sets connecting biological entities to the model of the theory of evolution would be created.
Considering the variety of biological entities that exist, many different data sets could be
created depending on the empirical study being done. This would result in a variety of
mediating models that connect all of these different data sets to the model of the high level
theory of evolution. Alternatively, these mediating models could focus on different selection
criteria or approaches to evolutionary theory resulting again in a variety of mediating models.
For example, one mediating model could focus on a metagenomic analysis while a different
mediating model could focus on a purely genetic analysis. Because the mediating models use
different methods to analyze how the theory of evolution interacts with the data sets, the
result may be mutually incompatible mediating models despite the fact that these models
connect the data sets to the model of the high level theory of evolution. Thus, the resulting
picture (Figure 3 on next page) in this case is a hierarchy with a proliferation of models that
each share a structure with the model of the high level theory.
16. Brading, “Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Modality,” 48.
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Figure 3 Applying Structural Realism to the Domain of Biology
Changing to shared relevant relations
In this example, it seems odd to discuss shared structure when talking about how the theory
of evolution relates to biological entities. The theory of evolution is not a mathematical
formulaic law like Newton’s laws of motion or law of universal gravitation. The theory
of evolution is about the dynamic relationship between biological data sets as impacted
by the environment or not. Thus, it seems more appropriate to discuss the connection
between models as one of shared relations and not shared mathematical or law-like structure.
Characterizing something as a shared relation, however, does not discount the possibility of
a mathematical or law-like relation. By changing to a hierarchy with proliferation of models
connected by shared relations, structural realism can more clearly be applied to disciplines
like biology that focus less on mathematical law-like relationships while still being applicable
to disciplines that do.
Unfortunately, changing to shared relations comes with the problem of relevance. If we
consider the biological example, we are not concerned with any shared relation. The goal
is to pick out a specific shared relation that is relevant to connecting biological entities and
the theory of evolution. Thus, I agree with Katherine Brading and Elaine Landry that
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we need a “methodological strategy of seeking out, exploring, and exploiting the notion of
the appropriate kind of shared structure”1718 For example, it is accurate to say that the
model of the theory of evolution, the mediating models, and the data models all share a
relation in which all biological entities are living. However, this relation is true of many
things and not just the theory of evolution; this is likely not the relation that evolutionary
biologists are concerned with. Instead, it is the relation of natural selection functioning in a
particular way in particular environments that relates different data sets and models to the
theory of evolution. Therefore, I argue that in order to be as clear and accurate as possible
when describing what is important and real, structural realism should be a hierarchy with
proliferation of models connected by a relationship of shared relevant relations.
The problem of incompatible mediating models
Brading notes that this version of structural realism has both benefits and drawbacks. The
benefit is demonstrated in this biological example where incompatible mediating models can
still explain the relationship of the data to the model of the high level theory through shared
structure. Brading’s use of multiple mediating models separates it from other structural
realism theories that use one particular isomorphism of the same structure connecting all
levels of the hierarchy resulting in a “cascade effect”.19 In other theories, this cascade effect
explains how the structure is maintained throughout the hierarchy. Brading, however, moves
away from isomporphism in an effort to better match how scientific theorizing is done and
recognize the fact that most mediating models “share features with both the data models
and the high level theory, but are also partially independent or autonomous”.20
The drawback to allowing incompatible mediating models is that “it is no longer clear
17. My italics. Katherine Brading and Elaine Landry, “Scientific Structuralism: Presentation and Repre-
sentation,” Philosophy of Science 73 (December 2006): 577, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/
518327.
18. It should also be noted that in the same quotation, Brading and Landry also point out that this
structure should be consistent across all directions of the hierarchy.
19. Brading, “Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Modality,” 44.
20. Ibid., 45.
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what it means to say that our higher level theory accurately represents the structure of
the world.”21 Because there are incompatible mediating models that are supposed to be
transparent and show how the model of the high level theory connects to the data, there is
a question as to how incompatible models can ultimately represent the one structure of the
world. If we consider our theory of evolution example, the problem of incompatible mediating
models remains despite changing from a shared structure to a shared relevant relation. For
example, how is it possible that both the purely genetic model and the metagenomic model
represent only one relation? It seems possible that the two models can present the same
structure in different ways and the difference is based on viewpoint. The problem is then
justifying the connection between these different and incompatible presentations with one
underlying relation. Saying that there are different viewpoints could equally mean that there
are different underlying relations being represented. Thus, even when extended to biology,
consideration must be given to how to justify a transparent hierarchy; that is how to justify
a notion of a shared relevant relation that results in incompatible mediating models.
Eliminativist ontic structural realism
As an alternative Steven French supports an eliminativist ontic structural realism for biology.
When considering the nature of biological entities, French accepts that there may be multiple
models within one hierarchy. In part this could be a practical consideration in order to make
computations plausible given our resources.22 For French even these idealized models may
still present an underlying structure.23 Another possible reason for there being multiple
models in one hierarchy could be “the different modeling traditions of different communities
(geneticists and theoretical biologist).”24 Different goals may also require the combination
21. Original italics. Brading, “Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Modality,” 57.
22. Steven French, “Shifting to Structures in Biology and Beyond: Metaphysics and Representation,”
chap. 12 in The Structure of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 335, isbn: 978-0-19-968484-
7.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 336.
8
of different elements into one model from say a model organism and a mathematical model
in order to create ‘synthetic’ models.25 Thus, it is not surprising to French that a structural
realist view of something like the theory of evolution may involve multiple mediating models
and multiple data models. For example, we noted earlier that there could be multiple
mediating models based on the selection criteria used. For French, this would represent both
a practical and community issue. The mediating model created would depend on the data
set selected by the community and the selection criteria. Thus, geneticists may use genetic
coding as selection criteria while evolutionary biologists may use a metagenomic approach
where they consider both the genetic coding and the environmental effects.
According to French, the fact that ‘biological structures are evolutionarily contingent’
leads to two options for structural realists.26 The first option is to situate “spatio-temporally
limited and evolving structures” in a version of “the principles of natural selection, under-
stood as globally invariant nomological generalizations as in physics.”27 So, there would be
a high level theory that stipulates these principles of natural selection. These principles are
then applied to a model of the high level theory which then connects to evolving and various
data sets through evolving and various mediating models. The second option for French is
a reductionism to a more fundamental non-contingent physical structure.28
French takes the second option and abandons the idea of biological objects because of “the
‘Problem of Biological Individuality’ and the heterogeneity of biological objects in general.”29
For French there is convincing evidence, particularly when considering definitions of concepts
like ‘the gene’, that it is difficult to come up with a clear outline of what constitutes the
biological object’s identity.30 There is a problem when defining biological individuals because
no such definition can be produced given the current usage of biological terms. This problem
becomes particularly salient when looking at metagenomics as described by John Dupré
25. French, “Shifting to Structures in Biology and Beyond,” 336.
26. Ibid., 337.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 338-339.
30. Ibid., 339-342.
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and Maureen A. O’Malley where the definitions of individuals relies on the marrying of
the genetics and the particular environment within which that genetic code is found. Not
to mention the fact, that these environments are constantly changing resulting in likewise,
constantly changing definitions.31 The issue of the heterogeneity of biological objects involves
the fluidity of biological entities due to consideration of the symbiotic nature of many entities
considered individual organisms or the fact that what is considered ‘one’ organism becomes
difficult to define spatially.32 What this all means for French is that a biological object is best
viewed as being “dependent upon the appropriate structures (‘nodes’) and from the realist
perspective, eliminable, or, at best, regarded as secondary in ontological priority.”33
The effect of metagenomics on structuralism
For French it is eliminativist ontic structural realism that can accommodate the challenge
metagenomics makes to the notion of an individual organism.34 According to Dupré and
O’Malley, metagenomics involves analysis of not just the genetics of the entity but also the
community and environmental context of this entity.35 Thus, for Dupré and O’Malley, “life
is in fact a hierarchy of processes (e.g.: metabolic, developmental, ecological, evolutionary)
and ... any abstraction of an ontology of fixed entities must do some violence to this dy-
namic reality.”36 In “Metagenomics and biological ontology” Dupré and O’Malley discuss
various types of metagenomic fields 37 including consideration of interdisciplinary efforts to
combine different organisms, networks, and conceptual levels of analysis in what is called
“metaorganismal metagenomics, or microbial systems biology.”38 For structural realists the
31. French, “Shifting to Structures in Biology and Beyond,” 344.
32. Ibid., 348-350.
33. Ibid., 350.
34. Ibid., 345.
35. Dupré and O’Malley, “Metagenomics and biological ontology,” 835.
36. Ibid.
37. These fields include studies of biodiversity metagenomics, evolutionary metagenomics, and functional
metagenomics, all of which combine analysis of the genome of the organism with analysis of the environment
these organisms are found in.
38. Dupré and O’Malley, “Metagenomics and biological ontology,” 839.
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important take away is that
In system-level understandings of microbial communities, the metaorganism is
conceived of as deriving causal powers from the interactions of the individual
components from which it is constituted. At the same time, however, those com-
ponents are themselves understood to be controlled and coordinated in various
ways by the causal capacities of the metaorganism.39
Further, these organisms, as described earlier need to be considered within the context of the
environment. This means that what might actually be considered the ‘real’ component of the
world that these studies represent is a system, relation, or structure, rather than individual
things.
Dupré and O’Malley’s view has informed French’s reasoning for moving towards an elim-
inativist view of ontic structural realism.40 The metagenomic view of organisms leads to a
picture of a dynamic organism that is the result of influences both within and outside the
organism. Because metagenomics views biological entities as not just their features but dy-
namic processes, the notion of one individual organism becomes difficult to define. Thus,
having an eliminativist view is fine because “there are no biological objects (as metaphysi-
cally robust entities). All there is are biological structures, interrelated in various ways and
causally informed.”41 So, how does one define something like a dog or human? According to
Dupré and O’Malley, what we consider a biological organism is a stable biological process
that does not remain stable because of durable parts “but rather the dynamic stability of
processes that constantly recreate or maintain their essential constituents.” To me, a dog
would need to be defined as an idealized model of a collection of self-maintaining processes
that creates a system that interacts with its environment in a specific way we have chosen to
call ‘dog’. Then in order to study the ways in which ‘a dog’ interacts with its environment,
we have used a sort of short-hand in the form of ‘dog’ instead of saying ‘a collection of
39. Dupré and O’Malley, “Metagenomics and biological ontology,” 841.
40. French, “Shifting to Structures in Biology and Beyond.”
41. Ibid., 345.
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self-maintaining processes that creates a dog system.’
This characterization of biological entities as metaorganisms could be helpful to Brading
when it comes to the problem of incompatible models. As we noted earlier, Brading was
trying to explain how the presentation of the structure could result in incompatible models
while still representing accurately the one structure found in the world. Brading notes that
unlike a scientific realist, a structural realist cannot rely on objects to ground the structure
in question.42 For the scientific realist, what connects the shared structure in the hierarchy
is how it connects similar versions of an object within incompatible mediating models. The
incompatibility of the mediating models in this case can result from incompatible features “of
the same fundamental kind of object” that is described in the high level theory.43 For Brading,
who sees the kind of biological object as a function of the shared structure, relying on objects
to connect the incompatible mediating models is unacceptable.44 It is the structure, not the
kinds of object, that is shared at all the levels connecting the model of the high level theory
to the mediating models and data models. There is a transparent hierarchy connected by
shared structure that is supposed to represent a real world structure and at the same time
present various incompatible models.45
If a metagenomic view is taken then the definition of the ‘object’ will depend on the
interactions this object has with the environment. Thus, multiple models will need to be
created in order to take into consideration the different kinds of environmental influences.
The one structure represented in the hierarchy will be presented differently depending on the
environment within which this structure is observed. Taking this a step further, one might
even be able to say that because there are different environments and therefore different
influences on the relation represented in the model, there are different mediating models of
this interaction and these mediating models may be incompatible depending on the com-
bination of environmental influences. This use of metagenomics may be too eliminativist
42. Brading, “Structuralist Approaches to Physics: Objects, Models and Modality,” 54.
43. Ibid., 55.
44. Ibid., 49.
45. Ibid., 56-57.
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for Brading though. Ultimately, it will depend on if Brading is willing to accept a notion
of biological kinds that are “in constant interactive flux: subtly different in every iteration,
but similar enough to constitute a distinctive process.”46 This line of argument would only
be useful to Brading if a self-sustaining type process can acceptably be defined as a kind of
biological object. For example, Brading would need to accept kinds of dogs as a shorthand
for kinds of ‘a collection of self-maintaining processes that creates a dog system.’
Eliminativist Relevant Relationalism
Dupré and O’Malley’s characterization of biological organisms fits well with my own view
that biological entities must be considered fluid and constantly changing. Like water in a
river, no matter where you dunk a bucket in to collect a sample, the next sample will be of
a slightly different water source. Similarly, human bodies seem to be constantly changing;
cells in the body are destroyed and new ones are created to replace them. Further, if we
consider that the gut contains bacteria that breakdown the food we eat, it is hard to say that
a human body contains only one organism. It does not. It contains at least two, namely the
human and the bacteria within the human gut. Without the bacteria the ‘human’ is unable
to process food and therefore will no longer be able to sustain itself and likely perish. Thus,
it is not entirely accurate to say that a human is just one self-sustaining process. It is in fact
multiple self-sustaining processes put together.
Given my view of biological entities, it would be preferable to move to a version of struc-
tural realism that represents a world of interacting processes, some self-sustaining and some
not. In order to capture both formula-like and organizational connections, I would use a
relationship of shared relevant relations. I further suggest that understanding what becomes
the ‘relevant relation’ would be dependent on the context including the goal and situation
within which the high level theory is being applied (See figure 4)
46. Dupré and O’Malley, “Metagenomics and biological ontology,” 841.
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Figure 4 Eliminativist Relevant Relationalism
For example, what part of the biological world do we want to look at? Imagine the question
is about humans and what foods they eat. In this case the relevant relation could be natural
selection but one model may include natural selection that impacted which gastrointestinal
organisms developed while a different model may not. Thus, we would need two separate
mediating models and possibly multiple data models.
My contextual approach allows consideration of specific relations for specific theories
while still being open to incompatible mediating models. This approach also considers the
fact that the biological processes that create the data sets include an element of random-
ization meaning that any two processes may have different results. Further, my contextual
approach can account for the fluid and dynamic view of organisms that Dupré and O’Malley
argue for which has an eliminativist flavor. Thus, I have named this approach Eliminativist
Relevant Relationalism.47
Concluding Summary
In this paper, I discussed two options for extending structural realism to the domain of
biology before presenting my own view. I first discussed Katherine Brading’s version of
47. I have not included “realism” in this name because I am still concerned that this view is consistent
with both empiricism as well as realism. A longer version of this paper will discuss the possibility of this
view maintaining a good argument for realism.
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structural realism with a hierarchy with proliferation of models. With a few modifications,
it seemed possible to use this form of structural realism as long as the relationship within
the hierarchy is one of shared relevant relations rather than shared structure. However,
the problem of incompatible mediating models still persisted. I discussed Steven French’s
eliminativist ontic structural realism as an alternative way to apply structural realism to
biology. I agreed with French that moving to an eliminativist version of ontic structural
realism makes sense particularly given the effect of metagenomics as described by John
Dupré and Maureen A. O’Malley. Metagenomics was then discussed as a possible way to
assist Brading with the problem of incompatible mediating models. However, this move is
only useful if it is acceptable to include dynamic, self-sustaining processes as kinds of objects.
Finally, I described my own contextualist view: eliminativist relevant relationalism.
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